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I t is Plaintiff-Respondent's position essentially that 
since the entire construction project was not complete 
at the time of the injury that no acceptance of that por-
tion of the fence completed could be effected. This view 
does not comport with reality because it fails to take into 
account the fact that most construction projects by neces-
sity involve "piecemeal" completion and acceptance. 
The first part of a road project to be completed is 
normally the fencing of adjacent landowners' property 
along the right of way under construction. As each phase 
is completed, it is inspected by the State and either 
approved or disapproved. What rational purpose for such 
inspection exists if the entire fence must be inspected at 
some later date (perhaps several years later)? As a 
practical matter, it simply is not done in the manner 
Plaintiff-Respondent suggests. Nor does it seem fair to 
indefinitely protract the contractor's potential liability. 
[See Appellant's Brief on Appeal, pp. 24-25.J 
There is ample evidence in the record that there 
was a practical acceptance by the State of the segment 
of fence in question. It was the State to whom the re-
sponsibility to third parties would shift upon a practical 
acceptance of the fence, and in this case, the State viewed 
the work as it was being done, saw that it was done in 
accordance with its plans and specifications and accepted 
the work as having been completed and thereby assumed 
the risk of harm to third parties which may occur as a 
result of the work. That the entire project is not com-
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pleted until some time in the future (some three or four 
years after the completion of the right of way fence in 
the case at bar) does not change the basic fact that, in-
sofar as the State was concerned, the fence was finished 
and there was nothing left for the contractor to do in 
connection with it. 
POINT II. 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE DO NOT PRE-
SENT SUFFICIENT REASONS TO EXTEND 
LIABILITY TO THE DEFENDANT-APPEL-
LANT, W. W. CLYDE & COMPANY. 
The Plaintiff-Respondent maintains that the doctrine 
advanced in the case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Com-
pany, 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050, L. R. A. 1916F, 696 
— that one who is negligent should be held liable to third 
persons who may foreseeably be injured by his conduct 
— has been extended to building contractors. The Mac-
Pherson rule has, in fact, been extended to building con-
tractors in many jurisdictions as a logical development 
of the doctrine's extension to the seller of chattels some 
twenty years earlier. 
I t is understandable that liability would be extended 
to building contractors because of the conceivable results 
of his negligence. Usually, in such cases, a structure of 
some sort is involved which is in most instances to be 
used by the general public or by persons who would not 
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normally have the opportunity nor the technical exper-
tise to inspect the structure for defects. 
The Tomchik case cited by Plaintiff-Respondent [p. 
10 of Respondent's Brief J is illustrative of this point. 
This was an action by purchasers of a house against the 
general contractors for death of their daughter from car-
bon monoxide poisoning and for injuries sustained when 
they were overcome by carbon monoxide gas, on the 
ground of negligent construction of a gas furnace. Here 
there was good reason to make an exception to the ac-
cepted work doctrine. Few homeowners would have the 
technical know-how to make a deteimination beforehand 
concerning the safety or reliability of a furnace. 
The Texas Law Review article cited by Plaintiff-Re-
spondent [p. 10 of Respondent's Brief] explains another 
basic reason for limiting the liability of the contractor; 
"The basis of the [accepted work] doctrine is 
that one who is not in privity of contract with 
the manufacturer or contractor cannot recover 
for injuries resulting from the performance of 
the work. This privity rationale as applied to 
manufacturers has been repudiated, but addi-
tional reasons for limiting a contractor's liabil-
ity have developed. The principal legal argu-
ment for limiting liability of a contractor is that 
an owner's negligence in maintaining a structure 
or land is the proximate cause of an injury while 
the contractor's negligence is only a remote 
cause. More significant, however, are the reasons 
which point to the special problems which con-
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front a contractor. A contractor, unlike a manu-
facturer, often does not engage in the production 
of fungible goods, or anything which closely re-
sembles a finished product; rather his work is 
often subject to the control and modification of 
subsequent parties. A contractor often has little, 
if any, choice in the selection of the plans, 
specifications, and materials winch he must use 
in his work. For these reasons the courts held 
that liability to third parties for injuries result-
ing from defects in construction work should at-
tach to the person in control of it. However, as 
indicated above, there are exceptional circum-
stances which cause the contractor to be liable. 
Among the more prominent are: (1) when a 
contractor's work creates a situation that is im-
minently dangerous to human life, and (2) 
knowledge by a contractor that he has con-
structed a dangerous article." Torts-Negligence 
— Independent Contractor Remains Liable After 
His Work is Accepted for Injuries Resulting 
from His Negligence, 41 Texas L. Rev. 599 
(1963). 
The case before this Court does not involve a situa-
tion that was imminently dangerous to human life nor 
can it be realistically asserted that W. W. Clyde & Com-
pany had knowledge that it had, in constructing the 
fence, constructed a dangerous article. 
The State of Utah has not expressly or otherwise 
repudiated the "accepted work" doctrine and this case 
does not present facts that would so warrant. Utah still 
requires privity of contract in actions against a manu-
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facturer based upon warranty and one would not expect 
a contractor to be held to a higher standard than a sup-
plier of chattels. This is not to say that the "modern 
rule" is without merit. If this case involved a structure 
or building that presented a danger to human beings, 
an argument for extending that doctrine might have some 
weight. Under the circumstances of the principal suit, 
it does not. 
Even in states that have repudiated the "accepted 
work" doctrine and abolished contractual privity as a re-
quirement, the limitation is still applied that where the 
contractor merely follows plans and specifications fur-
nished him by another, he may not be held liable unless 
the plans were obviously defective. [See Davis v. Hen-
derlong Lumber Company, 221 F. Supp. 129, 133 (N. D. 
Ind. 1963).] 
CONCLUSION 
As a practical economic reality, the fence in question 
was complete and accepted by the State at the time the 
Plaintiff-Respondent's cow and bull died. Construction 
of a fence is not the type of contraction that merits an 
extension of the "modern rule" and the "accepted work" 
doctrine is still controlling law in the State of Utah. Even 
if the Court were to extend the "modern rule" to this 
case, the limitation still applies that one who merely 
follows plans and specifications furnished him by the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
owner cannot be held liable unless the plans were so 
obviously defective as to preclude a reasonable man from 
following them. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORGAN, SCALLEY, 
LUNT & KESLER 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN 
Attorney for 
Defendant and Appellant 
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